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1 Introduction
The maximin principle is challenged about equity when applied to inter-
generational distribution. Rawls (1971) and Solow (1974) have pointed out
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to the participants at the conference for comments.
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that a direct application of the maximin principle brings a peculiar result.
One of the most fundamental features of the intergenerational distribution
of utilities or savings is that the first generation is the worst-off because
$s/he$ has no ancestor that will leave them heritage. Therefore, the optimal
path for the maximin principle is maximizing the first generation’s utility.
It implies that just saving is no saving. That’s why Rawls refuses to apply
the principle to intergenerational distribution and insists that each genera-
tion has a paternalistic concern to payoffs of its immediate descendant. It
is formalized by Arrow (1973), Dasgupta $(1974a, b)$ and Riley (1976) in the
optimal growth context. They made a dynamic model with paternalistic
utility functions and showed that the consumption path and the utility path
optimal for the maximin principle forms a saw-tooth shape. It seems to have
two problems: inequality and time-inconsistency. We focus the former.
To test the maximin principle for equity, we try to characterize the max-
imin path with egalitarian axioms. Our model is the same as Arrow (1973) $s$ .
We assume a utility of each generation depends on the consumption level of
its immediate descendant, and characterize the optimal path for the max-
imin principle in this model. Our approach to social welfare is both binary
relational and choice functional.
As the result, the optimal path is characterized with Group Equity, Weak
Pareto, and Efficiency in the relational approach, and Inclusion of Ham-
mond Superior Path, Exclusion of Pareto Inferior Path, $\alpha$ , and $\delta^{*}$ in the
choice functional approach. Group Equity is an extension of Hammond Eq-
uity, which is well-known equity axiom and often used to characterize the
maximin principle in intra-generational distribution. Inclusion of Hammond
Superior Path requires a social planner to choose more equal consumption
path in the sense of Hammond (1976) when the less one is chosen. We will
show the detail and the definition latter.
2 Arrow-Dasgupta Economy
Consider one private-good, non-overlapping, infinite horizon economy. Let
$N$ be the set of nonnegative integers, each element of which is used to rep-
resent a generation or time period. To simplify the problem of externalities,
we assume that each time period consists of one generation, and each gen-
eration consists of one representative individual. The private good can be
either consumed or used as capital which bears a return. $k_{t}$ denotes the
accumulated capital at the beginning of time period $t\in N$ . In that period
a fraction $c_{t}$ is consumed and the remainder $k_{t}-c_{t}$ is used in production.
94
Each unit used in production brings $\gamma$ units of the good at the end of the
period, and are transferred to the next period $t+1$ . Hence
$k_{t+1}=\gamma(k_{t}-c_{t})$ (1)
We generally assume that the economy is productive, so that
$\gamma>1$ (2)
A feasibility condition for production is naturally assumed. For all $t\geq 0$
$k_{t}\geq 0$ (3)
where $k_{0}>0$ is given initially. A feasibility condition for consumption is
naturally assumed. That is, any individual live any longer without con-
sumption. Hence, for all $t\geq 0$
$c_{t}\geq 0$ . (4)
Now we describe our subject to find a consumption path that satisfies
Rawlsian maximin principle for intergenerational justice. For the conve-
nience of description, we adopt the following notation: let $x_{t}$ and $p_{t}$ be
a real number and $l^{\infty}= \{X=(x_{0}, \ldots,x_{t}, \ldots)|\sup_{t}x_{t}<\infty\},$ $l_{+}^{\infty}=\{X\in$
$l^{\infty}|\forall t$ : $x_{t}\geq 0$}, and $l_{++}^{1}= \{P=(p_{0}, \ldots,p_{t}, \ldots)|\forall t : p_{t}>0\wedge\sum_{t=0}^{\infty}p_{t}<\infty\}$.
Denote a consumption path by the capital letter, $e$ . $g.,$ $C=(c_{0}, c_{1}, \ldots)$ .
rep $(c_{1}, \ldots, c_{n})$ presents the path $(c_{1}, \ldots, c_{n}, c_{1}, \ldots, c_{n}, c_{1}, \ldots)$ which consists of
$(c_{1}, \ldots, c_{n})$ repeated infinitely many times. By the feasibility condition, con-
sumption paths ought to be chosen from the set $\{C\in l_{+}^{\infty}|givenk_{0},$ $\forall t\geq$
$0$ : $0\leq k_{t+1}=\gamma(k_{t}-c_{t})$ }. It is convenient, however, to use the following
equivalent form:
$C=\{C\in l_{+}^{\infty}|PC\leq k_{0}\}$ ,
where $PC= \lim_{Tarrow\infty}\sum_{t=0}^{T}p_{t}c_{t}$, and $p_{t}=\gamma^{-t}$ .
We denote the utility function of generation $t\in N$ , or often called in-
dividual $t$ , by $W_{t}(C)$ when the consumption path $C$ is attained. Then the
maximin principle of justice gives a solution to the problem
$\max_{\in C}\min W_{t}(C)$ (5)
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We assume that each generation has sympathy to the next generation.
Generation $t$ derives utility from her own consumption $c_{t}$ and also bom
her $im\overline{m}$ediate $n-1$ descendants’ satisfaction, so that her utility function
depends on the consumption stream of $n$ generations beginning with his
own, and is denoted by $W_{t}(C)=V_{t}(c_{t}, c_{t+1}, \ldots, c_{t+n-1})$ . We assume that the
utility function $V_{t}$ is the same for all generations $t\in N$ , that is, $V_{t}()=V()$ for
all $t$ . Following the frameworks of Arrow (1973) and Dasgupta $(1974a,b)$ ,
we assume that $W$ is additively separable as to $t$ for simplicity, that the
felicities ascribed by individual $t$ to individual $t+1,$ $\ldots,$ $t+n-1$ are the
same as those ascribed by individual $t+1,$ $\ldots,t+n-1$ to themselves, that
the felicity function is the same for all $t$ , and that the felicity of the future
generation may be discounted in the utility of the present generation. That
is, for any consumption path $C=(c_{0}, c_{1}, \cdots)$ ,
$W_{t}(C)=V( c_{t}, c_{t+1}, \cdots c_{t+n-1})=\sum_{i=0}^{n-1}\beta_{i}U(c_{t+i})$ (6)
where $\beta_{0}=1$ and $\beta_{i+1}\leq\beta_{i}$ for $1\leq i<n-1$ . We also assume that
$\gamma^{i}\beta_{i}<\gamma^{j}\beta_{j}$ $(0\leq i<j\leq n)$ .
as Arrow (1973) did. This assumption requires that each generation obtains
more utility if she bequeathes capital to the next generation than that if
she consumes it by herself. Although the utility of the next generation is
discounted by $\beta$ , the total utility will go up if the in crease in production
is included. The utility function $U$ is assumed to satisfy the followings: (a)
$U$ : $\mathbb{R}+arrow \mathbb{R}$ is differentiable, and strictly concave. (b) $U’(c)>0$ . (c)
$\lim_{carrow 0}U(c)=-\infty$ . Then, the maximin principle of justice gives a solution to
the problem
$\max\min_{tC\in C}W_{t}(C)=V(c_{t}, c_{t+1}, \cdots c_{t+n-1})=\sum_{i=0}^{n-1}\beta_{i}U(c_{t+i})$ (7)
Now we present Arrow’s theorem on the maximin path when sympathy
to $n-1$ future generations prevails in the economy. Let $\hat{c}$ be the consumption
level for which the capital will be maintained intact, that is,
$\hat{c}=\frac{\gamma-1}{\gamma}k_{0}$ . (8)
For any $t$ such that $c_{t}=\hat{c},$ $k_{t}=k_{0}$ . In other words the constant consumption
$\hat{c}$ will cause $k_{t}$ to remain constant at the initial stock $k_{0}$ . Let $c_{0}^{R},$ $c_{1}^{R},$ $\cdots$ , $c_{n}^{R}$
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be the solution to the problem
$\max_{c_{0},c_{1},\cdots,c_{n-1}}V(c_{0}, c_{1}, \cdots c_{n-1})=\sum_{i=0}^{n-1}\beta_{i}U(q)$ (9)
$s.t$ . $\sum^{n-1}\gamma^{-i}$ $= \hat{c}\sum^{n-1}\gamma^{-i}$ . (10)
$i=0$ $i=0$
Theorem 1 (Arrow$(1973)$ ) Suppose $\gamma^{i}\beta_{i}<\gamma^{j}\beta_{j}$ for any $i,j\in N$ with
$0\leq i<j\leq n-1$ . Then the feasible consumption path which ma cimizes
$\min_{t}W_{t}$ is given by $C^{R}=_{rep}(c_{0}^{R}, c_{1}^{R}, \cdots c_{n-1}^{R})$ . For this path $c_{i}^{R}<c_{j}^{R}$ and
$W_{i}(C^{R})<W_{j}(C^{R})$ for $0\leq i<j\leq n-1$ .
The result can be illustrated in figure 1.
Figure 1:
3 Binary Relational Approach to AD Economy
In this section, we introduce a framework and results in Suga and Uda-
gawa$(2006a)$ . In the paper, an intergenerational justice is formalized as a
binary relation over a set of consumption paths. The binary relation whose
maximal path coincides with the maximin consumption path is characterized
by Group Equity and other axioms. Proof of each proposition is omitted
(see Suga and Udagawa $2006a$).
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3.1 Axioms for the Maximin Principle
We $wi1_{\wedge}1$ give a characterization of the maximin principle in the Arrow-
Dasgupta economy. An intergenerational preference ordering on $C$ is as-
sumed to be represented by a complete, reflexive, and transitive binary rela-
$tion\succeq$ . The strict preference $(\succ)$ and indifference $(\sim)$ relations are defined
as follows:
$C\sim C’\Leftrightarrow C\succ C’\wedge C’\succ C\sim\sim$
$C\succ C’\Leftrightarrow 0\succ\sim^{C’\wedge\neg(C_{\sim}’}\succ 0)$
Now we define some axioms for the characterization of the maximin prin-
ciple in the Arrow-Dasgupta economy. For any intergenerational preference
$\sim\succ$ a consumption path $C^{*}$ is called maximal if there exists no $C$ such that
$C\succ C^{*}$ . The first axiom is a condition to require the existence of the
maximal path.
Axiom 1 Effectiveness : For any $P\in l_{++}^{1}$ there $e$ vists a consumption path
$C^{*}$ that is mnimal in $C\in\{C\in l_{+}^{\infty}|PC\leq k_{0}\}$ .
The second axiom is the weak efficiency condition, which is familiar to
the axiomatic approach in social choice.
Axiom 2 Weak Pareto: For any $C$ and $C’\in C$ , if $W_{t}(C)>W_{t}(C’)\forall t\in N$ ,
then $C\succ C’$ .
The third axiom is Hammond equity principle, which is also well-known
in the theories of fairness. This axiom demonstrates that the social prefer-
ence of the consumption paths whose welfare levels differ from each other
only for the two generations should be determined by the preference of the
less favored.
Axiom 3 Hammond equity: For any $C$ and $C’\in C$ , if there $e$ vist $t^{1},$ $t^{2}\in N$
such that $W_{t^{1}}(C’)\geq W_{t^{1}}(C)\geq W_{t^{2}}(C)\geq W_{t^{2}}(C’)$ and $W_{t}(C)=W_{t}(C’)$ for
all $t\neq t^{1},$ $t^{2}$ , then $C\succ C’\sim$ .
We introduce a new axiom of equity among groups in order to describe
a fairness requirement that treats groups of generations equally if these
are regarded equal in utility profile. As an auxiliary step, we review the
lexicographic ordering $R^{L}$ on the Euclidean n-space $E^{n}$ . For every $v\in E^{n}$ ,




We may then define three binary relations $P^{L},$ $I^{L}$ and $R^{L}$ on $E^{n}$ by
$v^{1}P^{L}v^{2}\Leftrightarrow\exists r\leq n$ : $\{\begin{array}{l}\forall i\in\{1,2, \ldots, r-1\}v_{i(v^{1})}^{1}=v_{i(v^{2})}^{2}v_{r(v^{1})}^{1}>v_{r(v^{2})}^{2}\end{array}$
and
$v^{1}R^{L}v^{2}\Leftrightarrow v^{1}P^{L}v^{2}$ or $v^{1}I^{L}v^{2}$ for all $v^{1},$ $v^{2}\in E^{n}$ .
We are now in the position of defining an axiom called group equity.
‘Thlse any two groups $G_{1},$ $G_{2}$ which consist of finite number $n$ of succes-
sive generations. For any consumption path $C$ , we have two n-dimensional
vectors $\{W_{t}(C)\}_{t\in G_{1}}$ and $\{W_{t}(C)\}_{t\in G_{2}}$ . Let $i(G)$ be the index of the i-th
smallest component of $C_{G}$ , so that we have
$c_{1(G)}\leq c_{2(G)}\leq\cdots\leq c_{n(G)}$ .
When $\{W_{t}(C)\}_{t\in G_{1}}P^{L}\{W_{t}(C)\}_{t\in G_{2}}$ holds, we say that $\{W_{t}(C)\}_{t\in G_{1}}$ le vimin
dominates $\{W_{t}(C)\}_{t\in G_{2}}$ . With this notation we define an extension of Ham-
mond equity in the case of sympathy to $n$ future generations.
Axiom 4 Group Equity : For any $C$ and $C’\in C,$ $C\succ C’\sim$ if there exist $t^{r}$
and $t^{p}$ such that
1. $W_{t}(C’)\geq W_{t}(C)(t=t^{r}-(n-1), \ldots, t^{r})$,
2. $W_{t}(C)\geq W_{t}(C’)(t=t^{p}-(n-1), \ldots,t^{p})$,
3. $W_{t}(C)=W_{t}(C’)$ (otherwise), and
4. $\{W_{t}(C)\}_{t=t^{r}-(n-1),\ldots,t^{r}}$ leximin dominates $\{W_{t}(C)\}_{t=t^{p}-(n-1),\ldots,t^{p}}$ ,
then $C\succ C’\sim$ ’where $W_{t}(C)=W_{0}(C)$ for $t<0$ .
This axiom is a new requirement for equity among groups of successive
generations, which is applied to the case that a transfer $hom$ one genera-
tion to the other occurs. Such transfer increases the welfare of the trans-
ferred generation, as well as of the adjacent generation before this. This
also decreases welfare of the deprived generation as well as of the adjacent
generation before that. The reason why we need this type of requirement
is that a change of consumption in some generation under the feasibility
of the economy brings increase of utility on a group of successive genera-
tions and decrease on another group, which does not satisfy the conditions
presupposed in Hammond equity.
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3.2 Characterization of the Maximin Principle under Sym-
pathy
In this subsection, we characterize the maximin principle in the Arrow-
Dasgupta economy where each generation has sympathy to the immediate
$n-1$ future generations. The following lemmas show the important role of
group equity axiom.
Lemma 1 Suppose $that\sim\succ$ satisfies effectiveness, group equity and weak
Pareto. If $C^{*}$ is the maximal consumption path $of\succ\sim$ ’ then at $C^{*}$ gener-
ation $0$ has the minimum level of welfare, that is, $W_{0}(C^{*})= \min_{t}W_{t}(C^{*})$ .
Lemma 2 Suppose $that\sim\succ$ satisfies effectiveness, group equity and weak
Pareto. If $C^{*}$ is the maximal consumption path $of\succ\sim$ : then at $C_{f}^{*}$ in any in-
terval with the length $n$ , there is at least one generation whose welfare is the
minimum of $\{W_{t}(C^{*})\}_{t}$ , that is, $\forall t^{0}$ : $\min_{t^{0}\leq t<t^{0}+n}W_{t}(C^{*})=\min_{t}W_{t}(C^{*})$ .
Lemma 3 Suppose $that\sim\succ$ satisfies effectiveness, group equity and weak
Pareto, and that $\gamma^{i}\beta_{i}<\gamma^{j}\beta_{j}$ for any $i,j\in N$ with $0\leq i<j\leq n-1$ .
Then $c_{nl}^{*}<c_{nl+k}^{*}$ and $W_{nl}(C^{*})<W_{nl+i}(C^{*})$ for any $l,$ $n\in \mathbb{N}+,$ $0\leq i<n$ .
Lemma 4 Suppose $that\sim\succ$ satisfies effectiveness, group equity, and weak
Pareto. Then, genemtion $0$ in the ma vimal consumption path $C^{*}for\succ\sim has$
the largest welfare among all feasible consumption paths where generation $0$
has the least welfare among all the generations. That is,
$W_{0}(C^{*})=C \mathcal{D}_{0}\max_{\in}W_{0}(C)$
where $\mathcal{D}_{0}=$ { $C\in l_{+}^{\infty}|C$ is feasible and $W_{0}(C)= \min_{t}W_{t}(C)$ }.
These lemmas shows the next theorem in Suga and Udagawa (2006a). It
claims that the maximin path in the economy with sympathy is supported
by the ethical preference satisfying the above four axioms.
Theorem 2 Suppose $that\succ\sim$ satisfies effectiveness, group equity and weak
Pareto, and that $\gamma^{i}\beta_{i}<\gamma^{j}\beta_{j}$ for any $i,j\in N$ with $0\leq i<j\leq n-1$ . Let
$C^{*}$ be the maximal consumption path $of\succ\sim$ . Then, $c_{t}^{*}= \oint$ for all $t\in N$ and
$C^{*}=_{rep}(c_{0}^{R}, c_{1}^{R}, \cdots c_{n-1}^{R})$ .
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The next corollary shows that the later the generation comes, the higher
the level of consumption becomes for the generations in between those with
the minimum level.
Corollary 1 Suppose $that\succ\sim$ satisfies effectiveness, group equity and weak
Pareto, and that $\gamma^{i}\beta_{i}<\gamma^{j}\beta_{j}$ for any $i,j\in N$ with $0\leq i<j\leq n-1$ . Let $C^{*}$
be the maximal consumption path $of\succ\sim$ . Then, $c_{t-1}^{*}<c_{t}^{*}$ and $W_{t-1}(C^{*})\leq$
$W_{t}(C^{*})$ for $t\neq 0,$ $n,$ $2n,$ $\ldots$ .
When $n=1$ , that is, each generation cares about herself, her utility
function is given by $W_{t}(C)=W(c_{t})=U(c_{t})$ . In this economy we have
constant path if the social preference satisfies the three axioms except group
equity. Let $c^{R}$ be the solution to the problem max$c\in c^{\min_{t}}W(c_{t})$ . Then
we have the following result.
Corollary 2 Suppose $that\succ\sim$ satisfies effectiveness, Hammond equity and
weak Pareto. The maximal consumption path $C^{*}of\succ\sim is$ a constant path,
that is $C^{*}=_{rep}(\hat{c})$ .
4 Choice FUnctional Approach to AD Economy
In this section, we introduce a framework and results in Suga and Uda-
gawa$(2006b)$ . In the paper, an intergenerational justice is formalized as a
choice function mapping any feasible set of consumption paths to a proper
subset. The choice function whose value coincides with a set containing only
the maximin consumption path is characterized by Inclusion of Hammond
Superior Path and other axioms. Proof of each proposition is omitted (see
Suga and Udagawa $2006b$).
At first, define a choice function $G$ which maps any set $S$ of feasible
consumption paths to a non-empty subset of itself given a common utility
function, e.g., $G(S, W)(\neq\emptyset)\subset S$ . Similarly, we define a Rawlsian Choice
Function $G^{R}$ which selects a set of maximin paths $C^{R}$ for any set of feasible
consumption paths given a common utility function, e.g., $C^{R}\in G^{R}(S, W)$ .
It may not be well-defined in general, but discussions in latter shows that
so is it in this case.
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4.1 Axioms
In this subsection we define some axioms to characterize the maximin prin-
ciple in this simple dynamic economy.1 As an auxiliary step, we define two
binary relations on the set of consumption paths $\ell_{+}^{\infty}$ . The first is strict
Paretian $relation\succ^{P}$ , which is given by:
$C^{1}\succ^{P}C^{2}\Leftrightarrow\forall t$ : $W_{t}(C^{1})>W_{t}(C^{2})$ .
The second is Hammond equity $relation\succeq^{H}$ , which is defined by:
$C^{1}\succeq^{H}C^{2}\Leftrightarrow\exists t^{1},t^{2}$ : $(i)W_{t^{1}}(C^{1})\leq W_{t^{2}}(C^{1}),$ $(ii)W_{t^{1}}(C^{1})\geq W_{t^{1}}(C^{2})$ ,
$(iii)W_{t^{2}}(C^{1})\leq W_{t^{2}}(C^{2})$ , and $(iv)W_{t}(C^{1})=W_{t}(C^{2})\forall t\neq t^{1},$ $t^{2}$ .
Strict Hammond equity relation is given in the usual way as follows:
$C^{1}\succ^{H}C^{2}\Leftrightarrow C^{1H22H}\succeq C\wedge\neg C\succeq C^{1}$ .
Now we provide three kinds of axioms, e.g., an inclusion of some paths in
a choice set, an exclusion of some paths from a choice set, and a consistency
of a choice set for an expansion and a contraction of the feasible set. The
first and second axioms are requirements from the view point of the Pareto
criterion. The former axiom requires that, if a path is Pareto superior to the
path which is in the choice set, then the superior path must also be included
in the choice set. The latter requires that, if a path is Pareto inferior to
the path which is feasible, then the inferior path must be excluded from the
choice set.
Axiom 5 $G(., .)$ satisfies Inclusion of Pareto Superior Path$(IP)$ iff
$\forall C^{1},$ $C^{2}\in l_{+}^{\infty},\forall S\subset\ell_{+}^{\infty}$ : $[[C^{1}\succ^{P}C^{2}\wedge C^{1}\in S\wedge C^{2}\in G(S, W)]arrow C^{1}\in G(S, W)]$ .
Axiom 6 $G(., .)$ satisfies Exclusion of Pareto Inferior Path$(EP)$ iff
$\forall C^{1},$ $C^{2}\in l_{+}^{\infty},\forall S\subset\ell_{+}^{\infty}$ : $[[C^{1}\succ^{P}C^{2}\wedge C^{1}\in S]arrow C^{2}\not\in G(S, W)]$.
The third and fourth axioms are requirements from the view point of
the Hammond equity criterion. The former axiom requires that, if a path is
Hammond superior to the path which is in the choice set, then the superior
path must also be included in the choice set. The latter requires that, if
a path is Hammond inferior to the path which is feasible, then the inferior
path must be excluded from the choice set.
1For the choice theoretic framework of the social choice theory, see, for example, Sen
(1970) and Suzumura (1986).
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Axiom 7 $G(., .)$ satisfies Inclusion of Hammond Superior Path$(IH)$ iff
$\forall C^{12}$$C-\in l_{+}^{\infty},\forall S\subset\ell_{+}^{\infty}$ : $[[C^{1}\succeq^{H}C^{2}\wedge C^{1}\in S\wedge C^{2}\in G(S, W)]arrow C^{1}\in G(S, W)]$ .
Axiom 8 $G(., .)$ satisfies Exclusion of Hammond Inferior Path$(EH)$ iff
$\forall C^{1},$ $C^{2}\in p_{+}\infty\forall S\subset\ell_{+}^{\infty}$ : $[[C^{1}\succeq^{H}C^{2}\wedge C^{1}\in S]arrow C^{2}\not\in G(S, W)]$ .
The last two axioms are conditions of the consistency for the choice sets.
The fifth axiom is a requirement that any path in the choice set for a larger
opportunity set is also included in the choice set for a smaller opportunity set
if the path is still feasible. So, it is also called as set-contraction condition.
Axiom 9 $G(., .)$ satisfies Condition $\alpha$ iff
$\forall S^{1},$ $S^{2}\subset\ell_{+}^{\infty},$ $S^{1}\subset S^{2}$ : $\forall C^{1}\in S^{1}$ : $[C^{1}\in G(S^{2}, W)arrow C^{1}\in G(S^{1}, W)]$ .
The sixth axiom is a requirement that, if two consumption paths are
compared and both are to be chosen, then they must be equally evaluated
in the larger feasible set.
Axiom 10 $G(., .)$ satisfies Condition $\delta^{*}$ iff
$\forall S\subset l_{+}^{\infty}$ : $\forall C^{1},$ $C^{2}\in S$ : $[[\{C^{1}, C^{2}\}=G(\{C^{1}, C^{2}\}, W)]arrow[C^{1}\in$
$G(S, W)\Leftrightarrow C^{2}\in G(S, W)]]$ .
4.2 Main Theorem
We are in the position to provide our main theorem about the characteriza-
tion of the Rawlsian choice function, $G^{R}($ ., . $)$ .
Theorem 3 Suppose that $G(., .)$ satisfies $EP,$ $IH,$ $\alpha$ , and $\delta^{*}$ . Then, $G(F(k_{0}, \gamma),$ $W$)
$=C^{R}(F(k_{0}, \gamma),$ $W$).
To prove this theorem we need some lemmas.
Lemma 5 Suppose that $G(., .)$ satisfies $EP,$ $IH,$ $\alpha$ , and $\delta^{*}$ . Then generation
$0$ has the least welfare in all generations in any chosen path, that is, $W_{0}(C)=$
$\min_{t}W_{t}(C)$ for any $C\in G(F(k_{0},\gamma),$ $W$).
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Lemma 6 Suppose that $G(., .)$ satisfies $EP,$ $IH,$ $\alpha$ , and $\delta^{*}$ . Then, gener-
ation $0$ in $C\in G(F(k_{0},\gamma),$ $W$ ) has the largest welfare among all feasible
consumption paths where genemtion $0$ has the least welfare among all the
generations. That is,
$W_{0}(C)=_{C} \max_{\in D_{0}}W_{0}(C)$
for any $C\in G(F(k_{0},\gamma),$ $W$) where $\mathcal{D}_{0}=\{C\in l_{+}^{\infty}|C$ is feasible and $W_{0}(C)=$
$\min_{t}W_{t}(C)\}$ .
Lemma 7 If any path $C$ satisfies that $\sum_{s=0}^{n-1}\gamma^{-s}c_{s+in}\geq\sum_{s=0}^{n-1}\gamma^{-s}c_{\epsilon}^{R}$ for all $l\in$
$\mathcal{Z}+and\sum_{s=0}^{n-1}\gamma^{-s}c_{s+ln}>\sum_{s=0}^{n-1}\gamma^{-s}c_{s}^{R}$ for some $l’\in \mathcal{Z}+$ , then $C$ is infeasible.
We will provide inverse relations of Theorem 3.
Theorem 4 Rawlsian choice function $G^{R}$ satisfies $IP_{f}IH,$ $EP,$ $\alpha$ and $\delta^{*}$ .
With Theorems 3 and 4, we finally come to the following characterization
theorem.
Theorem 5 Suppose that the utility of generation $t$ is given by
$W_{t}= \sum_{i=0}^{n-1}\rho\iota U(c_{t+i})$ ,
that $\gamma^{i}\rho_{i}$ increases with $i$ for $i\in[0, n-1]$ , and that $\rho_{i}i_{8}$ non-increasing
with $i$ . Then the choice function $G(., .)$ satisfies $EP,$ $IH,$ $\alpha$ and $\delta^{*}$ , iff it is
Rawlsian, that is, $G(F(k_{0},\gamma),$ $W$) $=G^{R}(F(k_{0},\gamma),$ $W$).
4.3 Independence of Axioms
There is no choice function satisfies EH. It is impossible to strengthen IH to
EH.
Consider three consumption paths, $C^{1}$ and $C^{2}$ , such that $W(C^{1})=$
$(3,2,0,0,0, \ldots)$ and $W(C^{2})=(3,1,0,0,0, \ldots)$ . On one hand, let $t^{1}=1$ and
$t^{2}=0$ in the definition $of\succeq^{H}$ and then $C^{1}\succeq^{H}C^{2}$ . On the other hand, let
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$t^{1}=2$ and $t^{2}=1$ in the definition $of\succeq^{H}$ and then $C^{2}\succeq^{H}C^{1}$ . So both
$C^{1}$ and $C^{2}\not\in G(\{C^{1}, C^{2}\}, W)$ . It violates the non-emptiness of the choice
function.
If we drop IH, a myopic choice function satisfies the remains of axioms.
Example 1. A myopic choice function, $G(S, W)=$ arg max$c\in sW_{0}(C)$ ,
satisfies EP, $\alpha$ , and $\delta^{*}$ .
EP: By the hypothesis of EP, $W_{0}(C^{1})>W_{0}(C^{2})$ . So, if $C^{1}$ is feasible,
$G(S, W)$ does not contains $C^{2}$ by the definition of $G(., .)$ . Therefore EP
holds.
$\alpha$ : By the hypothesis of $\alpha$ and the definition of $G(., .)$ , generation $0$ has the
maximal welfare in $C^{1}$ among $S^{2}$ . So clearly it does so among $S^{1}(\subset S^{2})$ .
$\delta^{*}:$ By the hypothesis of $\delta^{*}$ and the definition of $G(., .)$ , generation $0$ has
the same welfare in both $C^{1}$ and $C^{2}$ and therefore the conclusion of $\delta^{*}$
holds.
Now, consider two consumption paths, $C^{1}$ and $C^{2}$ , such that $W(C^{1})=$
$(2, 0,0,0,0, \ldots)$ and $W(C^{2})=(1,1,0,0,0, \ldots)$ . IH requires $C^{2}\in G(\{C^{1}, C^{2}\}, W)$ ,
but $\{C^{1}\}=G(\{C^{1}, C^{2}\}, W)$ by definition. Therefore, IH does not hold.
If we replace EP with a weaker condition, IP, then a trivial choice func-
tion satisfies the set of axioms.
Example 2. A trivial choice function, $G(S, W)=S$, satisfies IP, IH, $\alpha$ ,
and $\delta^{*}$ .
This choice set always contains all feasible consumption paths. So the
conclusion of IP, IH, $\alpha$ , and $\delta^{*}$ holds for any feasible set and any utility
function respectively. Therefore, this choice function satisfies IP, IH, $\alpha$ , and
$\delta^{*}$ .
On the other hand, it clearly violates EP.
5 Concluding Remarks
We show the maximin consumption path in Arrow-Dasgupta economy is
supported by both ethical preference relation and choice function satisfying
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egalitarian axioms. This result claims the saw-tooth shaped path has an
egalitarian property.
However, ideas of the characterizing egalitarian axioms is different from
each other in a binary relational approach and a choice functional approach.
We guess the difference is caused by the position to use infeasible paths to
construct an ethical preference relation and a choice function. To formulate
and anaJyse it is our future problem.
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